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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-"STATE ACTION"-RACIAL DISCRIMINA-
TION-TAXATION- CHARITABLE DEDUCTION-FOUNDATION-The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that
a private foundation's practice of racial discrimination could be,
because of its tax-exempt status and other government contracts,
"state action" sufficient to invoke the prohibitions of the fourteenth
amendment.
Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1974).
"0 ye gods, how monstrous if I am not allowed to give or not to
give my own to whom I will."
Plato
The Reverend Donald L. Jackson presented the federal court sys-
tem with one of the more difficult constitutional questions facing
American jurisprudence today. The status and relationship of tax
exempt foundations' to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment have long been discussed by both legal commentators
and members of the philanthropic community.2 In Jackson v. Stat-
ler Foundation, 3 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit was given the rather unique opportunity of speaking to the
topic generally.' The court held that given certain specific circum-
1. "Private foundation" is defined in the INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 509(a) to include all
tax-exempt organizations under § 501(c)(3) except (1) churches, hospitals, educational insti-
tutions, and certain government agencies; (2) organizations which normally receive more than
one-third of their annual support from grants, gifts, contributions, membership fees, and sales
receipts, and less than one-third of their annual support from gross investment income; (3)
organizations closely affiliated with the above, i.e., operated by a "parent" organization to
carry out a given charitable purpose; and (4) organizations for public safety testing. A more
general definition provided by a foundation analyst is "a charitable organization that receives
its contributions from relatively few sources and spends its funds through grants or through
operating programs." Parrish, The Foundation: "A Special American Institution," in THE
FUTURE OF FOUNDATIONS 10 (F. Heimann ed. 1973).
2. See Clark, Charitable Trusts, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Will of Stephen
Girard, 66 YALE L.J. 979, 1004 n.96 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Clark] for a discussion
concerning early theory of tax exemptions as indicia of "state action." See also THE FUTURE
OF FOUNDATIONS 5 (F. Heimann ed. 1973).
3. 496 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1974).
4. The plaintiff-appellant appeared pro se, both in the district court and on appeal.
Presumably due to a lack of counsel, the complaint is almost barren of factual material
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stances, primarily tax-exempt status, a private foundation's prac-
tices could appropriately be "state action."5 While the implications
of such a decision to the edifice of American philanthropy are ob-
vious, of no less importance is the impact of the case upon the
evolution of the "state action" doctrine.
Reverend Jackson, a black man, brought suit in the United States
District Court, Western District of New York, alleging a practice of
racial discrimination by thirteen prominent charitable foundations
located in the Buffalo, New York, area.' The relief requested was
both injunctive and declaratory: the revocation of the foundations'
federal' and state8 tax-exempt status; damages; and a judicial de-
cree ordering forfeiture of all the foundations' assets to the U.S.
Treasury? Chief Judge John T. Curtin dismissed the complaint on
necessary for a complete resolution of the case. Missing are essential facts concerning the
particular structures, policies, and activities of the defendant foundations. Citing Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (dismissal of prisoner's pro se complaint reversed on ground that
such complaints are held to less stringent standards), the court applied a "generous" con-
struction to appellant's complaint and did not hold the inadequacies fatal. Thus, the court
was in a position to address the issue of private foundations and "state action" generally,
without the boundaries imposed by a specific set of facts: Do fourteenth amendment proscrip-
tions apply to private foundations that practice invidious racial discrimination? The court
assumed arguendo the existence of racially discriminatory policies of employment, invest-
ment, and disbursement of funds.
5. The court stated:
In sum, we believe that if on remand the district court finds that the defendant
foundations are substantially dependent upon their exempt status, that the regulatory
scheme is both detailed and intrusive, that the scheme carries connotations of govern-
ment approval, that the foundations do not have a substantial claim of constitutional
protection, and that they serve some public function, then a finding of "state action"
would be appropriate.
496 F.2d at 634.
6. The crux of Jackson's complaint was that the named foundations had discriminated
against him, his children, and his own foundation by refusing to hire him as a director of their
foundations, refusing scholarship aid to his children, and refusing grants to his foundation,
all for reasons of race. In addition, Jackson charged the foundations with general discrimina-
tory practice in matters of employment and investment. Id. at 625.
7. The federal tax provisions include INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c)(3) (exempts income
of the organization from taxation); id. § 170(c)(2) (itemized deduction for contribution al-
lowed); id. §§ 642(c), 2055, 2106(a)(2) (allowing various deductions for estate tax purposes);
id. § 2522 (allows deduction for purposes of gift tax).
8. New York state's definition of exempt organizations is in substance the same as the
federal definition provided by INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c)(3). The applicable state tax
provisions are NEW YORK TAX LAW § 1230 (McKinney 1966) (exemption from local taxation);
id. §§ 208, 615 (allow "piggy-back" treatment of federal income and corporate tax deduc-
tions); id. § 249-c (exemption of bequests from estate tax). While plaintiff-appellant did not
specify the particular state or federal provisions he was challenging, the court assumed he
was referring to these provisions. 496 F.2d at 626 n.4.
9. Both the district court and the court of appeals agreed that forfeiture of assets via
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the pleadings, ruling that Reverend Jackson had no standing to
challenge the foundations' tax exemptions, 0 that there were insuffi-
cient facts stated in the complaint" to found an action based on 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1985,12 and that any action based on 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983's was barred for lack of "state action."' 4 Reverend Jackson
judicial decree was inappropriate, and dismissal of that particular claim was affirmed. See
Wolkstein v. Port of New York Authority, 178 F. Supp. 209 (D.N.J. 1959).
10. The Jackson court dissolved the lower court's objections to appellant's lack of stand-
ing by a single reference to McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972), where
the standing issue was. treated at length. The McGlotten court, citing Association of Data
Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-53 (1970), as authority, granted
standing to a plaintiff in circumstances very similar to Jackson.
11. Some of the factual deficiencies were as simple as establishing appellant's residency
as Buffalo and expressing an intention to sue in a representative capacity. Others posed more
serious problems, such as documenting the alleged discriminatory patterns of employment
and investment and showing how appellant had been personally affected by such practices.
The court also stated that required joinder of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Tax
Commissioner of New York as party defendants, would be necessary on remand. In a bit of
judicial "coaching," the court suggested that joinder of these parties might completely elimi-
nate the "state action" dispute on remand, on the basis of Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp.
1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). There, the court revoked
the tax-exempt status of private schools practicing racial discrimination in Mississippi, with-
out ever reaching the constitutional question, and relying instead on a violation of "public
policy" argument. See note 54 infra. Thus, it is not inconceivable that the Jackson court's
emphasis will change on remand, from an equal protection argument to one founded in
"public policy" considerations. Appellant's § 1983 claim, see note 13 infra, insures, however,
that "state action" questions will still be of some importance on remand.
The dissent emphasized the fact that appellant Jackson was suing the foundations them-
selves, rather than the government agencies providing the tax benefits to those institutions.
In McGlotten and the other cases dealing with problems similar to that in Jackson, the action
was consistently brought against the responsible revenue official. This fact was not even
mentioned in the majority opinion, perhaps because the proper defendant will be joined on
remand when appellant is assisted by competent counsel.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no
other.
42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1970) prohibits conspiracy among government officials to deny a person's
civil rights.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
14. The "under color of the law" language found in the Civil Rights Acts has been inter-
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subsequently appealed to the Second Circuit.'5
I. THE STATE ACTION REQUIREMENT
Since the prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment" do not
reach purely private discriminatory conduct, a finding of some
"state action" was essential before the court could consider appel-
lant's contentions concerning either a § 1983 violation or a revoca-
tion of tax-exempt status. 7 The proclamation that private conduct
is unaffected by fourteenth amendment proscriptions, first articu-
lated by Justice Bradley in the historic Civil Rights Cases,'" has
echoed throughout courtrooms of this nation for more than a cen-
tury.'9 Subsequent case law has established that racially discrimina-
preted as being identical to the "state action" requirement necessary to invoke the fourteenth
amendment. See U.S. v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1965).
15. The opinion noted herein was written as a response to Judge Friendly's petition for
consideration en banc, which was denied after a 4-4 vote. Judge Friendly's determined opposi-
tion to the result in Jackson, as evidenced by both his petitions for en banc consideration
and his strong dissent, was to be expected. His often-quoted article, Friendly, The Dartmouth
College Case and the Public-Private Penumbra, 12 TEXAS L.Q. 141 (1969), leaves no doubt
of his strong opposition to judicial expansion of the fourteenth amendment, particularly into
the area of private philanthropy.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, provides in part that:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
17. The state tax exemptions are subject to attack by the provisions of the fourteenth
amendment. The federal income tax exemptions are reached by the due process clause of the
fifth amendment, which prohibits the federal government from aiding private racial discrimi-
nation in any manner that would be prohibited to the states by the fourteenth amendment.
See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1136
(D.D.C. 1970).
18. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). "Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter
of the amendment." Id. at 11.
19. "The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment have reference to 'state action' ex-
clusively, and not to any action of private individuals." Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318
(1880). "That amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discrimi-
natory or wrongful." Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). "[P]rivate conduct abridging
individual rights does no violence to the Equal Protection Clause .... " Burton v. Wilming-
ton Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961). See generally Van Alstyne, Mr. Justice
Black, Constitutional Review, and the Talisman of State Action, 1965 DUKE L. REv. 219
[hereinafter cited as Van Alstyne]. For evidence that authors of the fourteenth amendment
intended it to apply to purely private activity see Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment Against Private Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353 (1964); St. Antoine, Color
Blindness But Not Myopia: A New Look at "State Action" Equal Protection, and "Private
Racial Discrimination," 59 MICH. L. REv. 993, 995 n.9 (1961).
1974 Recent Decisions
tory activity on the part of the state, whether it be by legislation, 0
judicial enforcement," administrative decree," or unauthorized
acts of state agents, 3 will not be tolerated. Though clear at its
inception, this public-private dichotomy has been rendered an an-
achronism by the vastly expanded activities of both state and fed-
eral governments. Hampered by complex state involvement in the
lives of institutions and individuals, 4 the courts, using tools pro-
vided a century ago, are ill-equipped to separate public from private
in a fashion that will give meaning to the fourteenth amendment
and still retain s*ensitivity to both parties' constitutional claims.2 5
According to the commentators, the "state action" doctrine is a
hiding place for racism, 6 "a conceptual disaster area," 7 "a map
whose every country is marked incognito," 8 and "a self-
contradictory invention." 9 In short, it is a "doctrine in trouble."30
20. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (provision in California constitution allowing
owner's absolute discretion in sale of real property and forbidding subsequent legislation
altering such right held invalid).
21. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (judicial enforcement of racially restrictive
covenants constitutes "state action").
22. Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964) (health department regulation requiring
separate toilet facilities for blacks and whites is "state action" encouraging discrimination).
23. Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964) (private amusement park contracted with
deputy sheriff to enforce park's discriminatory policy).
24. In describing "state action" analysis, one commentator stated,
that the task is not that of testing a set of facts against a well-defined (or even ill-
defined) "concept," but rather that of noting and clarifying yet another of the wonder-
fully variegated ways in which the Briarean state can put its hundred hands on life.
Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69, 89 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Black].
25. The scholarly commentary critical of the current methods of handling "state action"
questions is voluminous. Authors' opinions vary from suggesting minor adjustments in em-
phasis to advocating the elimination of the concept completely. The following works handle
the issue most completely, and are among those sources most often cited: Black, supra note
24; Burke & Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Creditors' Rights: An Essay on
the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 1003 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Burke &
Reber]; Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the "State Action" Limit on the Equal
Protection Guarantee, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 855 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Silard].
26. Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Against Private
Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353, 1383 (1964).
27. Black, supra note 24, at 95.
The field is a conceptual disaster area; most constructive suggestions come down, one
way or another, to the suggestion that attention shift from the inquiry after 'state
action' to some other inquiry altogether.
28. Id.
29. "[I]t is essentially a self-contradictory invention, the use of which is unredeemed by
the myriad of ad hoc 'state action' roulettes establishing reviewability on a crazy-quilt basis."
Van Alstyne, supra note 19, at 245.
30. Black, supra note 24, at 91.
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But, however inept this doctrine may be, its underlying considera-
tions are still a critical part of the political philosophies of this
nation3 and must be incorporated into decisions involving issues as
presented in Jackson.
Early in its analysis, the Jackson court drew a critical distinction
between "state action" cases involving alleged racial discrimina-
tion and those cases involving other constitutional claims. 2 Since
the vast majority of "no state action" findings emerge from equal
protection cases where race was not a factor,33 it appears that courts
use a different standard for "state action" where violations based
on race are alleged.34 Whatever mysterious degree of state involve-
ment is required for a finding of "state action," clearly a lesser
amount is needed if racial discrimination is alleged. This double
standard undermines the precedential value of racial "state action"
cases used to support non-race allegations and also casts doubt on
the wisdom of dissenters who attack "state action" opinions with
criteria and holdings from non-racial cases.
The analysis used by the Jackson court has been labeled the
"incremental approach '3 5 or the "multiple factor analysis ' 3 and
had its origin in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority.37 Given
31. "Thus while the search for a merely formal connection-for 'state action'-is mislead-
ing, the search for the values which stand behind the state action limitation is indispensable."
Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REV. 3, 7 (1961). The notion of a pluralistic
society is fundamental to American political philosophy. Equally important is the belief that
certain aspects of private citizens' lives are just that-private, and beyond the scope of
governmental scrutiny. Such values motivated the development of the "state action" limita-
tion, and while the mechanics of applying the doctrine may have become distorted, the
importance of the concept has not diminished with time.
32. 496 F.2d at 628.
33. Id. at 629. The Jackson court cites a multitude of recent non-race "state action" cases
in which various courts made findings of "no state action." Most of them were due process
or freedom of speech claims.
34. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); United States v. Wiseman, 445 F.2d 792,
795 n.3 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 967 (1971); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968);
Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382, 1392-93 (N.D. Ind. 1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 412 (7th
Cir. 1971). Contra, Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old Ale House, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 593, 598 n.7
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (argues that the same standard should be used for determining existence of
"state action" in cases involving sex as used in those concerned with race).
35. Note, Academic Freedom, 81 HAlv. L. Rav. 1045, 1057 (1968).
36. Basset, The Reemergence of the "State Action"'Requirement in Race Relations Cases,
22 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 39, 65 (1972).
37. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). In Burton, the state of Delaware had leased space in a public
parking garage to a restaurant which subsequently practiced racial discrimination. In revers-
ing the findings of the lower court, the Supreme Court totalled the various minute contacts
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a complex fact situation with no direct or obvious control by the
state, the court lists the various subtle 'connections between the
actor and the state. Although no single connection would be suffi-
cient, the cumulative effect of these numerous contacts is used to
support a finding of "state action." The Burton approach is an
acknowledgment that modern "state action" problems are difficult
to analyze by facile formula.38 Disconcerting as it might be to those
who prefer their constitutional law in neat conceptual packages,3 9
* "[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the non-
obvious involvement of the state in private conduct be attributed
its true significance."4
II. THE FivE FACTOR ANALYSIS
The court began its "sifting and weighing" of specific facts by
isolating the five factors considered germane to a determination of
"state action": 1) the degree to which the private organization relies
on governmental aid; 2) whether the assistance given connotes gov-
ernmental approval of the organization's activities, or whether such
between the restaurant and state to find sufficient "state action." For a critical commentary
of the Court's analysis, see Lewis, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority-A Case Without
Precedent, 61 COLUM. L. Rav. 1458 (1961).
38. A recurring criticism of judicial handling of "state action" problems is the use of a
mechanical, formula-type analysis. Some commentators stress the extreme importance of
factual distinctions in "state action" cases, and warn that transfer of word-formulas from one
factual setting to another causes grossly distorted results. See Burke & Reber, supra note 25,
at 1012. Others suggest that such formulas are mere verbiage, hiding the real basis of the
decision-the courts' analysis of the competing interests involved. See 25 VAND. L. Rav. 1237
(1972).
39. The extreme difficulty of "fitting" the illusive body of "state action" theory, already
deformed by a century of judicial torturing, to today's complex private-state relationships has
caused more than one commentator to cry aloud in anguish. The remark of the distinguished
commentator, Herbert Wechsler, is typical: "[they are] decisions that for me provide the
hardest test of my belief in principled adjudication. ... Wechsler, Toward Neutral Princi-
ples of Constitutional Law, 73 H~Av. L. REV. 1, 26 (1959).
40. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961). The Supreme
Court's open-ended "sifting and weighing" language enabled considerable expansion of the
doctrine to include many relationships that traditionally would not have constituted signifi-
cant "state action." While the Jackson court pays lip-service to the Burton approach, 496
F.2d at 627, its actual analysis closely follows the traditional formula style, using criteria
developed in somewhat similar factual contexts. See note 68 infra, and accompanying text.
The court's adherence to a more structured, precedential-based analysis, despite the almost
unanimous criticism of such an approach both by commentators and courts, might be ex-
plained as a response to the challenge by fellow judges of the soundness of the result reached.
See note 15 supra, and accompanying text.
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aid is given to all without such connotation; 3) the extent to which
the private organization serves a public function; 4) the extent and
intrusiveness of government regulation of the activity; 5) the extent
to which the organization can claim recognition as a "private" or-
ganization based on associational or other constitutional grounds.4
A. Reliance on Governmental Aid
An inspection of the history and evolution of the American foun-
dation quickly reveals the symbiotic relationship such organizations
have with the system of taxation. 2 While it is difficult to ascertain
the motivations of contributors to private foundations, the court
suggested that the available empirical data indicated that tax bene-
fits were a prime consideration. 43 Unlike public charities, founda-
tions are financially dependent upon endowments or upon a very
small number of wealthy contributors (often corporations),4 and tax
considerations are likely to be far more important to those who give
to foundations. 5
Despite the absence of conclusive data, it seems that the court
was on firm ground in concluding that many private foundations
depend heavily on governmental aid. That conclusion assumes that
41. 496 F.2d at 629.
42. At the turn of the century, the five general foundations then in existence were much
the creation of classic philanthropists such as Andrew Carnegie. By 1930, despite growing
concern with social problems, there were fewer than 200 foundations. The next three decades
saw a skyrocketing tax rate, due primarily to World War I; in response there was a phenom-
inal growth in the number of tax-exempt foundations, until in 1964 they totaled 15,000. Of
the 26,000-plus foundations in existence today, 92% were formed in the last three decades.
B. WHrrAKER, THE PHILANTHROPOIDS: FoUNDATIONS AND SOCIErY 13 (1974).
43. 496 F.2d at 629-30 n.8.
44. Gifts by corporations are sometimes vulnerable to attack as being ultra vires. The
primary justifications that a corporate officer can give courts and disgruntled stockholders is
that these gifts both enhance the image of the corporation in the general community and
provide attractive tax advantages. If deductibility of these gifts were removed, corporate gifts
to foundations would likely cease.
45. The average citizen who gives a few dollars per year to the Heart Fund, muscular
dystrophy telethon, or other similar public charity, is probably not motivated by tax consider-
ations. There is substantial evidence that as the amounts given increase, and as one moves
into the realm of the "professional givers" who endow foundations and universities, the
reliance on tax benefits increases as well. See Bob Jones Univ. v. Connally, 341 F. Supp. 277
(D.S.C. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 472 F.2d 903 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 414 U.S. 817
(1973) (tax-exempt status revoked by Internal Revenue Service because of racially discrimi-
natory admissions policy of university). There, the university submitted numerous affidavits
from financial supporters stating that their giving would cease if contributions would no
longer be deductible.
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a tax exemption can be classified as a "governmental aid" or sub-
sidy. This concept has only recently found favor in some lower
courts," and has never been addressed directly by the Supreme
Court in a context similar to Jackson. All courts agree that direct
aid by the government, be it in the form of appropriations, 47 private
use of the eminent domain power," or judicial enforcement of dis-
criminatory activity," is governmental aid sufficient to bring its
beneficiaries within fourteenth amendment restrictions. But these
same courts have consistently found tax exemptions standing alone
to be insufficient for "state action."5 While the courts recognize
that a tax exemption is a contact between state and private party,
they deny that it is the kind or quality of involvement that consti-
tutes the "significant" 5' state action needed to trigger fourteenth
amendment proscriptions. 2 Tax deductions and exemptions are
"indirect" aid and have avoided constitutional objections because
of their blanket applicability and neutral application.
B. Connotes Government Approval
Various courts in a number of recent cases, however, have revoked
46. The following cases contain dicta that tax-exempt status is an affirmative form of
government aid: Falkenstein v. Department of Revenue, 350 F. Supp. 887 (D. Ore. 1972);
McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972); Bob Jones Univ. v. Connally, 341
F. Supp. 277 (D.S.C. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 472 F.2d 903 (4th Cir.), cert. granted,
414 U.S. 817 (1973); Pitts v. Department of Revenue, 333 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
47. Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945) (private library aided
by substantial public funds must comply with fourteenth amendment in employment prac-
tices).
48. Smith v. Holiday Inns of America, Inc., 336 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1964) (motel's acquisi-
tion of building site via eminent domain power conferred through its participation in redevel-
opment project was "state action").
49. See note 21 supra.
50. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (tax-exempt status of property owned by
religious organizations was not "state action"); Marker v. Shultz, 485 F.2d 1003 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (tax-exempt status of labor unions held not to constitute "state action"); Eaton v.
Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710, 713 (4th Cir. 1964) ("While a tax exemption, by itself, may not impose
upon the recipient the restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment . . .. [a t]ax exemption
may attain significance when viewed with other attendant state involvements"); Guillory v.
Administrators of Tulane Univ., 212 F. Supp. 674, 685 (E.D. La. 1962) ("a simple tax benefit
[does not evoke] state action. [Otherwise] every legal creature would be within the pros-
cription of the Fourteenth Amendment").
51. "There is no point in doing the usual dance about that word, 'significant'," says one
commentator. Black, supra note 24, at 84. Only significant "state action" will trigger four-
teenth amendment proscriptions. However, the failure of the courts to provide even vague
clues as to what is and what is not significant has left the term devoid of meaning.
52. For an excellent discussion of this issue see Note, The Internal Revenue Code and
Racial Discrimination, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 1215 (1972).
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the tax privileges of private organizations that practice racial dis-
crimination. 3 Using one of several theories,5 these courts managed
to provide the missing nexus and dissolve the neutral aura of tax
exemptions. A very sophisticated analysis of this type was put forth
by McGlotten v. Connally,55 an opinion heavily relied upon by
Jackson. The McGlotten court stated that a plaintiff, in order to
establish "state action," must show that the questioned revenue
provision did in fact aid, encourage, or perpetuate racial discrimina-
tion. To meet this burden, a plaintiff must first show that the defen-
dant organization had a tax-exempt status, benefitted financially
from that status, and practiced racial discrimination. Plaintiff can
use the theory, espoused by courts and commentators alike, that tax
exemption, at least in economic effect, is very similar to a govern-
ment subsidy. 5 Plaintiff's second burden is to show that the revenue
53. See cases cited note 46 supra.
54. In Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1157-61 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub noma. Coit v.
Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971), the court used statutory construction to remove tax-exempt status
from private schools that discriminate racially. The court stated that the "charitable" sec-
tions of the Internal Revenue Code are subject to the definitional mandates of the common
law of charitable trusts. Thus, just as racially discriminatory trusts have been found to be
by definition noncharitable, private schools that practice similar discrimination cannot
qualify as "charitable" for INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170.
A second theory is that granting federal tax benefits violates federal public policy, as
expressed in the United States Constitution and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000(d)-(4) (1970). In Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30
(1958), the Court held that fines imposed on owners of overweight trucks were not deductible
as "ordinary and necessary" business expenses under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 23(a)(1)(A),
because such an allowance would frustrate defined "public policies." This public policy
argument has become known as the "Tank Truck Doctrine." See Green v. Connally, supra
at 1161-64.
A third theory finds that federal tax benefits to discriminatory organizations violate 42
U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1970). The important language of that section reads:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrim-
ination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
Federal tax benefits have been found to be the type of "assistance" prohibited by this section.
See McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972).
While such theories are generally outside the scope of this note, they should be recognized
as means by which the withdrawal of tax benefits are being used to fight racial discrimination.
Given the unwieldiness of the "state action" doctrine, it would not be surprising to see the
appellant in Jackson take one of the above tacts on remand.
55. 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972).
56. Tax exemptions operate as a subsidy which must be offset by higher taxes on
non-exempt persons and organizations. These privileges cannot be excused as insignifi-
cant, for many charitable institutions could not survive if they were withheld.
Clark, supra note 2, at 1004 n.96. See also Wolfman, Federal Tax Policy and the Support of
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provisions in question were included in that group of exemp-
tions/deductions passed by Congress for the sole purpose of encour-
aging a particular activity or behavior. McGlotten recognized that
while some benefits may be given in an effort to reach an equitable
measure of net income,57 and some reflect an administrative deci-
sion that net income is so minimal as to make collection economi-
cally infeasible, there are also those exemptions and deductions
which exist solely to encourage a certain form of behavior." Finally,
a plaintiff must show that tax regulations required an organization,
in order to acquire exempt status, to be certified or approved by the
Internal Revenue Service.59 If these three burdens are met, a plain-
tiff has bridged the gap between the "neutral" tax exemption and
the institution's racial policy. By specifically listing the organiza-
tion as exempt, the government has in effect stamped it "Govern-
ment Approved," a stamp that must surely be interpreted as an
endorsement of the organization's activities. 0 The question in very
general terms becomes: Is this the type of value-free, across-the-
board exemption provided to anyone who happens to fall into the
category, or is this a privilege granted to encourage the activities of
specific groups with approved policies?
The circumstances of Jackson fit nicely into the analytical frame-
work established in McGlotten, and the court uses this approach in
finding governmental aid and approval embodied in the tax bene-
fits. There is very little doubt concerning Congressional motives for
exempting foundation income and providing deductions for do-
Science, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 171, 172 (1965). In his concurring opinion in Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664, 690 (1970), Justice Brennan noted that while tax exemptions and subsidies were
similar in terms of economic impact, they were qualitatively different. Subsidies, he argued,
give more power to the grantor to direct the uses of the money, while exemptions are "passive
assistance."
57. Examples would be INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162 (deduction of business expenses);
id. § 172 (provision for net operating loss carryovers); id. §§ 1301-05 (income averaging).
58. Examples of such provisions are INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 163 (deduction for mortgage
interest); id. § 167(k) (accelerated depreciation for rehabilitation of low income rental hous-
ing); id. § 169 (amortization of air pollution control facilities).
59. In McGlotten, the court pointed to INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170(c)(4) as specifying
fraternal orders as eligible to carry on the prescribed activities. In addition, each fraternal
order had to acquire a letter of determination from the Internal Revenue Service before
contributions could be deducted.
60. There is the additional element that tax "aid" to an institution must be seen as aiding
the purpose for which that institution exists. While an individual may use "freed assets" from
a tax benefit for any number of purposes, an institution is limited to the purpose for which it
was created. Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 1083, 1103 (1960).
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nors.1' And, like fraternal orders, private foundations must apply to
the Internal Revenue Service for tax-exempt status, specifically
stating the "benefits, services, or products"62 provided.
The connotation of governmental approval will serve to distin-
guish Jackson from its most formidable obstacle, Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis.13 In Moose Lodge, the Supreme Court, for the first time
in seventy years," handed down a "no state action" decision in a
racial context. Irvis was refused service as a guest in the restaurant
of the Moose Lodge, a private club. With the plaintiff arguing that
Pennsylvania's grant of a state liquor license to the club supplied
the needed contact for "state action," the Court, after addressing
the narrower issue of standing,65 held that Irvis had failed to demon-
strate sufficient state involvement. The Court pointed to the appar-
ent neutrality surrounding the issuance of such a license and the
lack of any benefit to the state which would make the state a joint
venturer with the Lodge. It is precisely these elements of mutual
benefit and government approval that distinguish Jackson from
Moose Lodge.
C. Public Function
That a private organization performs a public function or acts as
a surrogate for the state is an established basis for finding "state
action."" The Jackson court seemed somewhat reticent to pursue a
61. The original congressional motive in passing the general charitable deduction provi-
sions of § 170 was to provide an incentive for the citizen-taxpayer to donate to organizations
promoting the general welfare, thus relieving the government's burden. See 55 CONG. REC.
6728 (1917) (remarks of Senator Hollis on passage of the original provision, Revenue Act of
1917, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 330). A comment made by Mortimer Caplin, while Commissioner of
the Internal Revenue Service, supports this view: "The promotion of private philanthropy
through tax forgiveness is a basic tenet of the United States tax system." FOUNDATIONS:
TwENTY VIEwPoINTs 18 (F. Andrews ed. 1965).
62. See "Application for Recognition of Exemption," Form 1023, Form 872-C, and In-
structions 1023, Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service.
63. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
64. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906) (no "state action" in slavery-type labor
contracts of private corporation). See Black, note 24 supra, at 84-85. But cf. Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (blanket closings of city pools found to be "state action," but
not discriminatory "state action" since all citizens were affected equally).
65. Since appellant Irvis had never applied for membership in the Lodge, he was denied
standing to question its discriminatory membership policy. That Irvis brought the action as
an individual and refused to broaden it into a class action also contributed to the Court's
narrow scope of inspection. 407 U.S. at 166. See 8 NEw ENG. L. Rav. 251 (1973).
66. The "public function" criterion originated in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946),
where a privately owned "company town" was held to perform a "public function," making
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public function argument because the foundations' specific activi-
ties were not set out in full in the complaint. Assuming the defen-
dant foundations are not part of that small clique of eccentric-
purposed organizations not designed to benefit the general public, 7
the court may have overlooked a very strong argument. Despite
criticism," the "public function" test is solidly engrained as a valid
criterion in "state action" litigation and is especially relevant to the
private foundation: Even though foundations are privately con-
trolled, their primary purposes and functions are self-avowedly pub-
lic." In addition, foundation activities are often coterminous with
government participation in particular projects and, indeed, often
reach similar dimensions. 0 It is regrettable that the court gave the
the fourteenth amendment applicable to its officials' actions. In Amalgamated Food Employ-
ees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968), the test was broadened considerably.
A shopping mall was found to be the "functional equivalent to the business district in
Marsh," thus limiting the Plaza's right to curtail first amendment rights. Id. at 318. Contra,
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). The test has also been used, as in Jackson, in
cases using a "cumulative contacts" analysis. For a thorough look at the "public function"
test from two perspectives see Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964), particularly the dissent
by Justice Black, id. at 318, who authored the opinion in Marsh.
67. Of the 26,000-plus foundations in the United States, most provide grants for such
traditional efforts as education, welfare work, and scientific research. Some foundations deal
in less traditional areas, for example, the foundation which provided funds for French peas-
ants to dress as matadors or hula maidens. The donor's intent was to prove that there was
no degradation to which the French would not stoop for money. Another example is the fund
to provide one baked potato at each meal for every girl at Bryn Mawr. Parrish, The Founda-
tion: "A Special American Institution," in THE FUTURE OF FOUNDATIONS 17 (F. Heimann ed.
1973).
68. The inability to draw the line between what is and what is not a "public function"
serves as the basis for most of the criticism directed at the test. Commentators state that
once activities other than those performed exclusively by the government are included in
"state action," one cannot consistently exclude any other "function" as nonpublic. The great
problems experienced by the courts in applying the "business affected with the public inter-
est" test to a legislature's power to regulate business are indicative of the problems of the
"public function" criterion. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 531-36 (1934). See also
Note, Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76 HAsav. L. REv. 983, 1069 (1963).
While commentators recognize the vitality of the "public function" test in a limited number
of situations, see note 66 supra, many recommend limiting it to those instances where, in a
conscious effort to circumvent the fourteenth amendment, states place a public facility in
private hands. See Burke & Reber, supra note 25, at 1067. While there is much merit in the
commentators' remarks concerning the "public function" test, most of their criticism is
inapplicable when applied to the "private" foundation. See note 69 infra.
69. The literature dealing with the subject of foundations, much of it financed and/or
published by foundations themselves, talks in terms of the "public trust" under which these
organizations operate. The following comment is typical: "Tax-exemption is conferred for the
purpose of facilitating the performance of a public task by a private agency." Parrish, The
Foundation: "A Special American Institution," in THE FUTURE OF FOUNDATIONS 27 (F. Hei-
mann ed. 1973). See also comments by the noted foundation spokesman, Andrews Emerson,
in THE FOUNDATION DIREcTory 45 (2d ed. Walton Lewis ed. 1964).
70. In the words of one commentator, "It would be incongruous if philanthropy, while
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"public function" test so little attention. As an established "state
action" indicator, a showing of public function should have been
used in support of the court's tax-benefit analysis, making the
court's holding more palatable to those who may oppose expansion
of the "state action" concept.
D. Governmental Regulation
The Jackson court then examined the extent and intrusiveness of
the governmental regulatory scheme affecting foundations, a
scheme established primarily by the Tax Reform Act of 1969.71 To
illustrate the pervasiveness of the government's regulation of foun-
dation affairs, the court cited rules of mandatory public disclosure
of foundation assets" and prohibitions against self-dealing and nep-
otism,73 and pointed to the extensive surveillance over foundation
activities by special I.R.S. agencies." One wonders, however, if the
court's efforts are not misdirected, since the "regulatory scheme"
criterion of "state action" developed from litigation in which state
regulations forced or strongly encouraged a private citizen to prac-
tice discrimination. For instance, the state regulation in Robinson
v. Florida75 required restaurants to maintain separate washroom
facilities for blacks and whites. While agreeing that the state regula-
tion did not prescribe segregated eating facilities, the Court, finding
operating with the helping hand of government and performing the same essential functions,
was to be held to a lesser standard." Clark, note 2 supra, at 1010.
71. Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487, amending INT. REv. CODE OF
1954. For a detailed discussion of the substance and effect of the 1969 Tax Reform Act, which
was directed primarily at private foundations see Private Foundations and the 1969 Tax
Reform Act, 7 COLUM. J. LAW & Soc. PROB. 240 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Private
Foundations]. The effects of this Act are generally beyond the scope of this note.
72. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6104. The court also quoted at length id. § 6056, which
requires a foundation to file annually a detailed financial report with the Internal Revenue
Service.
73. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 4945(a)-(d), (g), prohibit grants for activities not contem-
plated by the tax exemption. These provisions, designed to prevent frivolous grants as a form
of reward, are a response to the notorious Ford Foundation grants to Senator Kennedy's staff,
following his assassination. McGeorge Bundy, then president of the foundation, said the
grants were generally available to men "talented, dedicated, devoted, and concerned," but
was hard pressed to explain why, out of the whole nation, all eight recipients were chosen
from one small Kennedy headquarters office in Washington. Private Foundations, supra note
71, at 251.
74. See CCH Parv. FOUND. REP. 6502. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 4940 provides for a
4% excise tax on the net investment income of private foundations to finance the "watch-
dog" activities mandated by the 1969 Tax Reform Act.
75. 378 U.S. 153 (1964).
Vol. 13: 329
Recent Decisions
"state action," said that requiring restaurant proprietors to keep
separate sanitary facilities was so burdensome as to encourage dis-
crimination. As in other "state action through regulation" cases, the
scheme was one that strongly encouraged private discrimination. In
the Jackson case, the public disclosure, self-dealing, and nepotism
regulations simply had very little relevance to the encouragement
of discrimination and thus to the "state action" issue,7" except per-
haps to show additional foundation-government involvements.
E. Constitutional Privilege
The final factor analyzed by the court was the private founda-
tions' right to assert a particular privilege of privacy in associational
or other similar constitutional terms. The Jackson court here ap-
peared to recognize the numerous commentators who have strongly
advocated the adoption of a "balancing of respective constitutional
interests" test as the most appropriate form of analysis in "state
action" questions." Some commentators have even suggested that
judges often do employ a "balancing of interests" technique in the
actual decision-making process of a particular case.78 When two
parties with competing constitutional claims stand before the court,
it is clear that the rights of one must be made subordinate to the
other. Thus, courts have been forced to establish priorities among
constitutional rights. The Jackson court, pointing to strong author-
ity in the area, concluded that the freedom to dispose of one's prop-
erty as desired is indeed a protected right,7" but this right cannot
be exercised in a racially discriminatory manner if the exercise in
any way involves the state." The court's analysis presumes the ulti-
76. Judge Friendly noted that the court ignored
this essential distinction between a regulatory scheme in which a private institution
plays a part in an offensive government policy and one which is designed to prevent
the institution's acting in an abusive way ....
496 F.2d at 639.
77. See note 25 supra.
78. See note 38 supra.
79. See Gordon v. Gordon, 332 Mass. 197, 124 N.E.2d 228, cert. denied, 349 U.S. 947
(1955) (court enforced a will provision passing property to daughter on the condition that she
marry a member of the Jewish faith); United States Nat'l Bank v. Snodgrass, 202 Ore. 530,
275 P.2d 860 (1954) (court, in giving effect to testator's intent, enforced a will with "anti-
Catholic" provisions but did not find "state action").
80. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (land grant by testator for "white only" park
to be administered by city held invalid); Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, 353 U.S. 230
(1957) (part of lengthy litigation concerning the will of Stephen Girard and the provisions
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mate issue in the case-that private foundations and the govern-
ment are sufficiently entangled to trigger the fourteenth amend-
ment. The real significance of the discussion by the court is that the
court gives formal recognition to the weighing of constitutional in-
terests as a critical factor in "state action" analysis. Clearly the
court correctly isolated the appropriate interests involved, and the
great weight of authority supports its choice of equal protection as
the prevailing interest."1
III. Jackson's IMPACT
When the various aspects of the court's "state action" analysis are
pieced together, a logic emerges that amply supports the rather
limited holding of Jackson."2 The opinion is, as the dissent points
out, somewhat open-ended. But that is the nature of the beast,
for "state action" analysis is typically directed at distinguishing
other cases rather than relying on precedent. In Jackson, once the
theory of tax exemption as a subsidy is accepted, the result is inevi-
table. The court's argument is supported by ample precedent, and
the major cases seemingly inconsistent are easily distinguished;"
endowing a private school for white males only); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). As
stated in Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nor. Coit v. Green, 404
U.S. 997 (1971):
The individual philanthropist cannot be indulged in his own vagaries as to what is
charitable; he must conform to some kind of norm, else he cannot obtain subsidy or
tax exemption. Similarly, the general principle of a "desire to benefit one's own kind"
is an acceptable incentive to philanthropy as applied to a wide range of causes. But it
takes on a different and unacceptable hue when it is manifested as racial discrimina-
tion.
Id. at 1163.
81. See cases cited note 80 supra.
82. The court made a finding of "state action" only as to the Buffalo Foundation, whose
directors were appointed by various government officials, a situation clearly controlled by
Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, 353 U.S. 230 (1957) (that an official agency of the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania was a trustee of Girard College was sufficient in itself to invoke
"state action"). The dissent agreed with the panel's opinion concerning the Buffalo Founda-
tion. As to the other defendant foundations, the court remanded the case to the district court
for additional fact-finding, holding only that the actions of a foundation could, given certain
circumstances, constitute "state action."
83. The dissent, relying on Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), disagreed with the
Jackson court's tax-benefit analysis. Walz concerned a taxpayer's challenge to New York and
federal tax exemptions to religious organizations; plaintiff argued that such exemptions vio-
lated the establishment clause. Denying plaintiff relief, the court analyzed government rela-
tionships with private organizations via the tax system, but did so from an altogether differ-
ent perspective than the Jackson court. The Walz holding that a tax exemption to a religious
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yet one is left with the feeling that something is amiss. This uneasy
feeling is compounded by Judge Friendly's heated attacks on the
panel's opinion 4 and his utilization of the dissenter's old
standby-"staggering implications" extending far beyond the facts
of the case. Other factors, such as the sensitive nature of "state
action" questions generally and the status of American philan-
thropy as a "sacred cow," more concretely explain the feeling that
"something is surely wrong here." 5 A moment's reflection, however,
reveals that the effect of the Jackson decision on the great majority
of American foundations will be minute at best.
First, foundations will be insulated from spurious suits both by
the cost of litigation and by the heavy burden of proof imposed upon
a plaintiff. The difficulty of showing a discriminatory pattern of
investment will probably be formidable: The mere allegation that
a grant was denied due to race, without evidence that the founda-
tion's policy was and continues to be one of racial discrimination,
will go nowhere. Assume, for instance, that a plaintiff can show that
a particular foundation has never awarded a grant to a member of
a minority group, does not employ members of minority races, and
has not invested in any minority controlled businesses. The founda-
tion could defend itself by stating that the alleged pattern was not
the result of any definite policy of the foundation, but was simply
de facto. The burden would be on the plaintiff, according to
Snowden v. Hughes,8 to show that the discrimination was purpose-
ful. Thus, foundations with no official policy of discrimination
would be protected, regardless of the nature of their past activities.
Second, the claim is unfounded that foundations, in order to be
organization is not excessive entanglement or support in first amendment terms has very little
relevance to the Jackson equal protection decision that the tax-exempt status of private
foundations may be "state action." See also notes 61-64 supra and accompanying text.
84. Judge Friendly goes/as far as to liken the panel to a spider, and the defendant founda-
tions to its helpless prey. "Although the defendants . . . may somehow manage to escape
from the net the panel has woven .... " 496 F.2d at 637 (footnote omitted).
85. One commentator stated that the paradox in "state action" decisions is that even
though courts are not overruling any precedents or radically departing from previous styles
of "state action" analysis, ". . . somehow a feeling persists, and is passionately expressed
that massive Doric columns are falling." Black, supra note 24, at 88-89.
86. 321 U.S. 1 (1944).
But a discriminatory purpose is not presumed . . . there must be a showing of clear
and intentional discrimination. . . .Thus the denial of equal protection by the exclu-
sion of negroes from a jury may be shown by extrinsic evidence of a purposeful discrimi-
natory administration of a statute fair on its face.
Id. 8-9 (citations omitted).
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capable of defending against such actions, will be required to spend
precious dollars on additional record-keeping. The Tax Reform Act
of 1969 already requires that foundations keep extremely detailed
records concerning the issuance of each grant and the acceptance of
every contribution. 7 In the unlikely event that a civil rights suit
should be filed against a foundation, the data needed to defend
against such an action would already have been compiled, eliminat-
ing extensive administrative cost.
Third, there is the oft-expressed warning that the "constitution-
alizing" of private philanthropy will destroy much of the pluralistic
value of these institutions."' While the value of private foundations
to a pluralistic society cannot be underestimated, one must wonder
how much of this value would be lost by curtailing foundations that
practice malicious racial discrimination. The ability of a foundation
to support innovative or highly controversial research will not be
hindered by the Jackson decision. Nor will support of extremely
eccentric, highly unpopular, or anti-establishment activities in any
way be suppressed." Such freedom of activity provides the real
merit of foundations in a pluralistic society, and it will continue
unfettered.
Fourth, there is the very legitimate concern that the holding in
Jackson will frustrate those discriminatory foundations that serve
socially beneficial causes. 0 For instance, it would be difficult for a
87. See notes 71-74 supra and accompanying text.
88. One of the virtues of the private foundation, in pluralistic terms, is its ability to work
effectively in areas prohibited to the government. As Judge Friendly said,
[l]t is the very possibility of doing something different than government can do, of
creating an institution free to make choices government cannot-even seemingly
arbitrary ones-. . . which stimulates much private giving and interest.
Friendly, The Dartmouth College Case and the Public-Private Penumbra, 12 TEXAS L.Q. 141
(1969). Some commentators call the charitable contribution "the older generation's substi-
tute for civil disobedience," thus recognizing the foundation's role as a viable alternative for
donors frustrated by the incompetency or inefficiency of modern government. Bittker,
Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions or Matching Grants?, 28 TAX L. Rxv. 37, 61 (1972).
There are those scholars, however, who warn that generalizations concerning the pluralistic
benefit of foundations will not sustain the institution against the type of attacks currently
being made against it. "Cliches about the virtues of pluralism are no substitute for real
thinking." THE FUTURE OF FOUNDATIONS 5 (F. Heimann ed. 1973).
89. See Private Foundations, supra note 71, at 241. For an argument that the private
foundation is necessary to the continuation of democratic society see L. STONE, FEDERAL TAX
SUPPORT OF CHARITIES AND OTHER EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: THE NEED FOR A NATIONAL PoucY,
Hearings on H.R. 13,270 Before the Committee on Ways and Means on the Subject of Tax
Reform, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 155, 167 (1969).
90. In reference to charitable trusts that benefit minority groups, Clark has stated: "The
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foundation providing grants exclusively to black college students or
chicano children to circumvent the holding of Jackson. Although a
purely mechanical application of the court's holding might remove
tax benefits from such organizations, it is more likely that, by sifting
and weighing circumstances, a court might reach a more just re-
sult.' Thus, the only foundations definitely vulnerable to Jackson
'are those with maliciously discriminating racial policies. It is criti-
cal to note that Jackson does not invalidate such foundations or
interfere with the rights of a donor to dispose of his property in a
discriminating fashion-it merely denies the helping hand of a tax
exemption or deduction in the process.
Many of the potential problems raised by Jackson could be elimi-
nated by more affirmative action on the part of the Internal Reve-
nue Service. While some commentators predict that application of
equal protection standards to any portion of the Internal Revenue
Code will produce a "parade of horrors,"92 such fears may be more
imagined than real. In the case of foundations, the Internal Revenue
Service has been provided with all the tools necessary to effectively
screen foundations before granting tax-exempt status. 3 Repeated
involvement as a party defendant in litigation similar to Jackson
should inform the Internal Revenue Service that granting exempt
status should involve more than ritualistic filing followed by an
almost automatic approval. 4 A sincere effort by the Internal Reve-
nue Service to enforce the federal public policy against racial dis-
crimination would solve many potential problems. The Internal
Revenue Service has been able to inspect other institutions before
argument, so cynically made in other areas of race conflict, that segregation benefits both
races, has a ring of truth in this context." Clark, note 2 supra, at 983.
91. A court, using the "sifting and weighing" technique espoused in Burton, could con-
sider such factors as the specificity of the class which the fourteenth amendment was particu-
larly designed to protect, the enormous amount of foundation wealth available to members
of majority races, and the foundations' "charitable" nature in the common law sense.
92. Most of these criticisms fail to take into account the critical distinctions drawn by
McGlotten concerning different "types" of tax exemptions and deductions. For example, a
business that practices racial discrimination would not lose its "ordinary and necessary"
business expense deduction, for such a deduction is not of the "government approved" char-
acter singled out in McGlotten. See Note, 50 N. CAR. L. REv. 1132, 1146 n.61 (1972).
93. The information which foundations are required to file with the Internal Revenue
Service would be sufficient to allow at least a preliminary judgment concerning exempt
status. The 4% excise "surveillance" tax paid by foundations could be used to help finance
such investigations. See note 74 supra.
94. See 45 TEMP. L.Q. 657, 660 (1972).
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granting exempt status 5 and there is no reason why it cannot be
done with foundations.
CONCLUSION
While the thunder produced by racial conflicts of past decades
has died down, and the more glaring and disabling forms of racial
discrimination are being eliminated, the job for which the four-
teenth amendment was fashioned is far from done. Officially sup-
ported racial discrimination must be completely removed from the
body politic of the United States, and methods and attitudes such
as those developed by the Jackson court go far toward effecting a
cure. The importance of Jackson is not to be found in its effect on
American philanthropy as a whole, for such influences are likely to
be minimal. The real significance of the case is that it demonstrates
the courts' continual willingness to adopt new methods, however
unique, for combatting racial discrimination. The Jackson court is
the most prestigious body to recognize the "tax-benefit" analysis of
McGlotten; such recognition continues the trend toward using the
Internal Revenue Code as a powerful new weapon to combat racial
discrimination.
Permeating the court's opinion is the attitude that racial discrim-
ination, even when only indirectly supported by governmental ac-
tivity, is an abomination that cannot and will not be tolerated.
Thus, the court reveals a strong sensitivity to the real spirit and
purpose of the fourteenth amendment. Some commentators have
shown concern that recent cases such as Moose Lodge indicate the
judiciary's change of attitude toward the issue of racial discrimina-
tion." These same commentators foresee a softening of judicial atti-
tudes toward minor racial discrimination, along with a reluctance
to further expand the "state action" concept to cope with more
subtle forms of officially supported racial discrimination. The
attitude of the Jackson court may help to ease such fears.
David Whitney
95. In response to litigation, the Internal Revenue Service issued press releases and subse-
quent revenue rulings stating that exemptions to private segregated schools would cease, and
that an inspection of a school's racial policy would be made in the future before exempt status
would be granted. I.R.S. News Release, July 10, 1970, 7 CCH 1970 STAND. FED. TAX REP.
6790; I.R.S. News Release, July 19, 1970, id. 6814.
96. See Note, The Decline and Fall of the New Equal Protection: A Polemical Approach,
58 VA. L. REv. 1489, 1510 (1972). See also Black, supra note 24, at 97-98.
97. See 8 N. ENG. L. REv. 251 (1973); 26 RUTGERS L. REv. 888 (1973).
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